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IMMOVABLE LAWS, IRRESISTIBLE RIGHTS: NATURAL LAW. 
MORAL RIGf--iTS, AND FEMINIST ETHICS 
By Christine Pierce, University Press of Kansas, 200 I 
Reviewed by Rebecca Whisnant 
University of Southern Illinois 
This collection of Pierce's essays traces the evolution of her thinking 
about nClturClI law theory-Clnd, more broadly, about talk of "natures" as 
110rlllCltively significant--over a period of 30 years. We see her move 
from a wholesale rejection of such tCllk, in her influential 1971 piece 
"Natural Law Language and Women," to a qualified admission that it can 
have its liberatory uses. Yet she maintains throughout that, progressive 
potential 01' no, natural law is far inferior to Kantian notions of rights and 
Clutonomy as a fOlindMion for ethical thought. 
Pierce's early argument in "Natural Law Language and Women," 
revised and updated for this collection, stands out for its clarity and force. 
Its influence on later commentators such as Richard Mohr is plain ; that its 
core argument is by now familiar does not detract from its importance for 
any attempt to ground morCllity in conceptions of the "natural." As Pierce 
shows, there is no automatic positive value attached to what is natural, 
except when "natural" is used teleologically to describe something's 
function or purpose. But in that case, she argues, the positive valence is 
not necessarily moral: a good bomb is· one that performs well its function 
of destruction, but knowing this tells us nothing about when (if ever) it is 
morally good for that function to be performed. 
In her essays on gay marriage, AIDS, homosexual sex, and women's 
roles, Pierce shows that natural-law-based arguments still make regular 
Clppenrances in COUlt cases and elsewhere in public discourse. Those who 
believe that the charge of "unnaturalness" functions more often as a tool 
of oppressive social control than as a substantive moral criticism will find 
plenty of fodder here. 
Her most philosophically compelling argument against natural law 
theory, however, is outlined in Chapter 3 ("NaturCIl Law and Moral 
Rights"). Responding to Alan Donagan's attempt to incorporate elements 
of traditional naturClI law within a Kantian frame'vvork, she argues con-
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vincingly that any such attempt is doomed to failure . She outlines sever-
al ways in which the core of Kantian moral theory is irreconcilable with 
that of trad itional natural law theory. Most fundamentally, natural law 
theory is incompatible with " Kant's fundamental insight about the nature 
and worth of persons"-namely, that they are ends in themselves, pos-
sessors of autonomy, and sources of law. 
As she recognizes, this is most clearly true of the Thomist tradition 
of natural law thinking, with its emphasis on the "great chain of being" 
in wh ich each class has the natural function of serving the c lass above it 
in the chain . As Pierce points out, such a view clearly licenses treating 
some classes of persons as mere means to others' ends. Granted, we 
could rescue the account from some of its most egregious implications 
by granting that all persons belong to the same class (so that women, for 
instance, are not deemed the natural servants of men). Even so, the 
metaphysical (and hence moral) damage is done-persons, like other 
beings, are here seen essentially as means (to God ' s ends, presumably) 
rather than as ends in themselves. Relatedly, Pierce charges, the natural 
law tradition casts the virtue of persons in the same mold as that of 
objects; a good person is one who fu lfils well the function of persons, just 
like a good car fulfils well the function of cars. There is no sharp divid-
ing line here between persons and things; hence, it is not surprising that 
the view licenses (indeed, it seems, requires) treating persons as mere 
means. Pierce concludes that "the Kantian doctrine of moral personhood 
should lead us to a rejection of the natural law tradition of Aquinas and 
Aristotle." 
Pierce usefully contrasts this tradition of thought about "natural func-
tions" with Plato's competing account. In Plato's version, there are no 
separate functions for different classes of people; rather the function of 
human beings in general is reason, and the function of each is to do what 
he or she is good at. The wisest and most able persons, then, fu lfi II their 
functions by leading and guiding; superiority here yields responsibility 
rather than entitlement to others' service. In these respects, as Pierce 
says, Plato's account is far more attractive than that of Aristotle and 
Aquinas. Regrettably, however, she says little about the extent to which 
her criticisms of natural law theory apply to Plato's account (or to suit-
ably updated versions of it). Granted, as she notes, the Thomist version 
has had far greater historical influence; nonetheless, there is surely tbeo-
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retical interest in whether and how this historically significant competing 
version of "natural function" talk in moral discourse can be reconciled 
with modern conceptions of autonomy and rights. 
Pierce does observe that, even on Plato's account, individual choice 
about one's roles and activities must take a back seat to performing one's 
proper function. While this restriction of personal autonomy is unlikely 
to appeal to contemporary liberals, it seems qualitatively different from 
that required by Aristotle's view, since here one's function is at least 
defined according to one's individual qualities and abilities. Neither is it 
clear, to me at least, that Plato's view licenses treating some persons as 
mere means to others' ends. 
In any case, Pierce's comparison of these two ancient versions of nat-
ural-function talk sets the stage for further discussion-by Pierce or oth-
ers-of whether Plato's view runs afoul of core Kantian norms in the 
same ways that the Aristotelian/Tholllist tradition does. Her arguments in 
this chapter, of course, are to some degree preaching to the choir, since 
they are unlikely to convert any natural law proponents who are not 
already at least proto-Kantians. But in showing that we cannot have it 
both ways-that, again, synthesizing efforts such as Donegan's are mis-
guided-Pierce nonetheless makes a significant contribution. 
In the final chapter ("Natural Law Today"), Pierce assesses several 
contemporary attempts to rehabilitate natural law theory. After convinc-
ingly criticizing Cristina Traina's attempted integration of natural law 
with feminist philosophy, she turns her attention to two very different 
authors who base substantive ethical conclusions on observations of the 
natural world: sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson and biologist Bruce 
Bagem ih I. 
Pierce's discussion of Wilson's attempt (in his COl7silience) to shift 
ethics toward "a science-based material analysis" shows clearly that her 
own points in "Natural Law Language and Women" still need reiterating 
th irty years later. Wi Ison contends that by using empirical methods to 
discover the biological forces that predispose us to make certain kinds of 
choices, we can reveal a new kind of foundation for ethics. He himself 
grants, however, that there are some "natural" human drives and prefer-
ences that we should follow and encourage, and others we should sup-
press. As Pierce points out, it is not at all clear how empirical methods 
are to help us distinguish between the two. She locates an illuminating 
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example in Wilson's contention that men's attraction to heavily made-up 
women is a result of male animals' natural preference for "supernormal 
stimuli," that is, for images of females whose physical features are exag-
gerated (ironically enough) beyond those typically found in nature. 
Wilson contends that "the entire beauty industry can be interpreted as the 
manufacture of supernormal stimuli"; the clear implication is that the 
industry is therefore natural, inevitable, and beyond criticism. Pierce 
responds by rem inding us of the many ways in which the beauty industry 
harms, shames, and constrains women in order to conform them physi-
cally to male expectations-showing once again that a preference's "nat-
uralness" does not exclusively establish its moral credentials. 
Pierce's discussion ofBagemihl's Biological Exuberance exemplifies 
another of the book's recurring themes: the use of "nature" to support lib-
eral or radical moral positions rather than conservative ones. Although 
Bagemihl is not a philosopher, his observations of widespread homosex-
ual behavior and orientation among nonhuman animals is clearly meant 
to debunk the centuries-old claim that homosexual ity is morally wrong 
because unnatural. Bagemihl suggests that, on the contrary (in Pierce's 
words), "homosexuality, transgender, and nonreproductive heterosexual-
ity are all part of biological diversity, which is intrinsically valuable." 
Pierce is suitably restrained in her assessment of the moral impoli of 
Bagemihl's work. "Even though there is no logical entailment between 
'what is' and 'what ought to be'," she says, "there is generally an impact 
on people's lives and attitudes that comes from knowing what seem to be 
the facts." For instance, accounts like Bagemihl's may assuage gay peo-
ple's experience of "loneliness in the universe ... feeling like an aberra-
tion in nature." A realistic perception of facts about the natural world 
(including humans as biological organisms) can thus aid our reflection 
about our place within larger systems, comforting and challenging us in 
turn. While Pierce's comments on this phenomenon are suggestive, I 
would have liked to hear more about how, if at all, "nature" bears on oLlr 
actual moral obligations and entitlements. Granted, nature does not gen-
erate immutable moral Jaws based on the natural kind to which one 
belongs; nor does it provide a foundation for ethics. But in what ways (if 
any) does it shed light on what we ought to do, or on what counts as a 
morally admirable human life? Are facts about nature and our place in it 
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morally significant in ways that go beyond their effects on our beliefs and 
attitudes? 
The moral force of Bagem i hi's account, it seems, I ies not just in the 
fact that animal homosexuality is a naturally occurring phenomenon, but 
rather in the fact that biological diversity (of which it is a part) is benefi-
cial and indeed necessary. Ultimately, then, the implicit moral argument 
is a consequentialist one: biological diversity- including sexual varia-
tion , including among humans-i s good in that it contributes to a thriving 
biosphere and hence has beneficial consequences for beings (including 
human ones) within that biosphere. The themes evoked here are similar 
to those of several other contemporary progressive movements, such as 
those against genetically modified food and against some of the new 
reproductive technologies. The common theme is that altering and inter-
fering with nature in certain ways is morally wrong, not simply because 
it is unnatural but because it is seriously harmful to human s and other ani-
mals (and, depending on one's theory of moral status, to the earth or bios-
phere itself). My suspicion is that, in many of the contexts in which 
appea I to nature yields progressive conclusions, the true basis for those 
conclusions is not any kind of updated natural law theory, but rather an 
informed and enlightened consequential ism . 
As a feminist, Pierce is concerned throughout with the implications 
of various theoretical frameworks for women and other oppressed groups. 
Her com ments on such matters are un iformly cogent. often shedd ing light 
not just on the shortcomings of natural law theolY but also on the politi-
cal necessity of rights theory and other foundations of En I ightenment lib-
eralism. For instance, Chapter 6 ("Rights and Responsibilities") reminds 
liS that rights talk is especially appropriate and necessary in relationships 
of unequa I power and authority, where the more powerful party cannot 
simply be assumed to be trustworthy or interested in fulfilling his respon-
sibi I ities to the less powerful party. I.n Chapter 7 ("Postmodern ism and 
Other Skepticisms"), Pierce offers a limited defense against claims that 
fem inist ph i losophy is or shoul.d be unequivocally al igned with postmod-
erniSIll. Particularly welcome is her clear explanation of the distinction 
between universal explanatory theories (often, and rightly, criticized by 
feminists as excessively totalizing and hence exclusionary) and univer-
salization in ethics . The latter, as Pierce points out, "does not fail to tell 
the stories of some because it tells no stories at a II." 
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One of the book's most interesting claims is found in Chapter 2, 
"Eros and Epistemology." In a single deft move, Pierce both defends 
Plato against certain accusations of sexism and charges some of the crit-
ics themselves with heterosexism. In response to the claim that Platonic 
metaphysics excludes women, Pierce contends that in fact, "platonic 
metaphysics in its very nature excludes heterosexuals. Throughout the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus, the eros that is required for the achieve-
ment of knowledge is homosexual." She thus denies that the eroticism 
aiding our ascent to knowledge of the Forms has to be male, but she also 
rejects the view that it could be any old eroticism at all. The latter view, 
she notes, has sometimes been seen as "the on ly way" to let women back 
into the picture; therein lies the heterosexism. It is unclear to me whether 
Pierce believes that Plato was correct in claiming special epistemic 
virtues for homosexual eroticism as such. Marilyn Frye's well-known 
claim of such advantage for lesbians seems more plausible at first glance, 
in that it trades on the political position of women and lesbians rather than 
simply on the bodily "sameness" of the partners. 
